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THE GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIZATION 
OF INFORMATION OVER SANCTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPLIANCE 
VERONICA ROOT MARTINEZ * 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Who should be responsible for stopping misconduct within organizations?1 
One might think it should be the primary responsibility of federal prosecutors to 
aggressively seek to bring criminal cases against rogue corporations. Or one 
might look to regulators as those charged with creating a series of checks and 
balances to ensure that wrongdoing within firms is easy to detect and prevent. 
Still others might look to the corporations themselves to ensure that their 
employees are acting within the bounds of legal and regulatory requirements. In 
reality, each of these three actors—prosecutors, regulators, and the firm itself—
are responsible, in different ways, for responding to the misconduct that occurs 
within corporations. And when they fail, there are often significant 
consequences. 
Take, for example, Purdue Pharma. Prosecutors investigated Purdue Pharma 
in the mid-1990s and determined that it “knew about ‘significant’ abuse of 
OxyContin in the first years after the drug’s introduction in 1996 and concealed 
that information.”2 Instead of indicting executives on felony charges, as 
recommended by the prosecutors investigating the company,3 the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) decided to pursue less severe enforcement activity and settled the 
case. Purdue Pharma paid $600 million in fines and other payments, a significant 
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 1.  The arguments in this Article are applicable to organizations generally, regardless of form—
non-profit, for-profit, etc. However, legal scholars seem to think of these concepts as falling in the 
corporate crime bucket, so I will use the terms corporate or corporation throughout the rest of the 
Article. 
 2.  Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew its Opioids were Widely Abused, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html 
[https://perma.cc/5BPX-RMHB]. 
 3.  Id. 
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and, at the time, one of the largest sums ever paid.4 The Food and Drug 
Administration, the regulator overseeing Purdue Pharma, chose not to force the 
company to reformulate OxyContin in 2001, which would have made the drug 
more difficult to abuse.5 And Purdue Pharma, on its own, chose not to 
reformulate OxyContin until 2010, despite the fact that it was allegedly aware 
that the drug was highly addictive, often abused, and associated with overdoses.6 
Unfortunately, the damage was done, and OxyContin wreaked havoc in 
communities all across the United States. Ultimately, Purdue Pharma entered 
into a nationwide settlement in 2019, which contemplated the dissolution of the 
firm,7 and, in 2020, pleaded guilty to criminal charges for opioid sales.8 Yet, it is 
safe to say that while the harms caused by OxyContin were known for over a 
decade, the actions taken by prosecutors, regulators, and the firm largely failed 
to adequately mitigate the damage the drug caused, and continues to cause, to 
people and communities.9 The question is why? 
When large scandals are discovered, the firm itself is certainly held to account 
by the public for its failure to prevent harm, but often the government also finds 
itself the subject of criticism. Why did regulators not act more aggressively 
towards Wells Fargo?10 Why did the government not prosecute more individuals 
 
 4.  Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html [https://perma.cc/92Q2-Z74N]. 
 5.  Barry Meier, A Nun, a Doctor and a Lawyer—and Deep Regret over the Nation’s Handling of 
Opioids, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/health/opioids-purdue-
pennington-gap.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/3X43-EWFY]. See also OxyContin: 
Balancing Risks and Benefits: Hearing on Examining the Effects of the Painkiller OxyContin, Focusing 
on Federal, State and Local Efforts to Decrease Abuse and Misuse of this Product While Assuring 
Availability for Patients Who Suffer Daily from Chronic Moderate to Severe Pain Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 16, 33 (2002) (statement of Dr. John K. Jenkins, 
Director, Office of New Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA) (noting the FDA’s 
cooperative efforts with Purdue Pharma to strengthen warnings on OxyContin labels and to reformulate 
the drug “as part of a longer-term strategy,” including discussion of concerns about how effective 
reformulation might be). 
 6.  Meier, supra note 5. 
 7.  Jan Hoffman, Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purdue-pharma-opioids-settlement.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K23A-8RR9]. 
 8.  Jan Hoffman & Katie Benner, Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for Opioid 
Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/health/purdue-opioids-criminal-
charges.html [https://perma.cc/DH48-JL3R]. 
 9.  See William N. Evans, Ethan M. J. Lieber & Patrick Power, How the Reformulation of 
OxyContin Ignited the Heroin Epidemic, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 5 (2019), https://www. 
mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest_a_00755 [https://perma.cc/KWB6-G6CG] (discussing how 
even after its reformulation, abusers of OxyContin switched to the cheaper and easily-available heroin 
as a substitute). 
 10.  See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, OFF. OF ENTER. GOVERNANCE & THE 
OMBUDSMAN, LESSONS LEARNED: REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS FARGO 
4–14 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/banker-education/files/pub-
wells-fargo-supervision-lessons-learned.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3QZ-RUWS] (listing findings that 
permitted the Wells Fargo sales practices scandal and recommending nine courses of action); James 
Rufos Koren, Bank Regulator Disputes Democrats’ Criticism that Agency Didn’t Reform After Wells 
Fargo Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-occ-wells-response-
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for the 2008 financial crisis?11 The critique comes in a variety of forms, but often 
boils down to questioning why federal prosecutors and regulators are unwilling 
to enforce laws to the fullest extent possible against corporations who commit 
corporate misconduct through their employees or agents.12 This Article puts forth 
a new account to help explain the decision by governmental actors to prioritize 
the receipt of information from, over the pursuit of high-level sanctions of, 
corporate offenders. 
Part II discusses the current rationales for corporate criminal liability from 
law and economics scholarship13 and the Holder Memorandum.14 It next turns to 
the traditional justifications for punishing individuals for criminal conduct and 
their applicability to corporations in light of the goals laid out in the Holder 
Memorandum. It then provides two examples that demonstrate the tensions 
presented when the government chooses to levy a sanction below the highest 
possible penalty against a firm who is repeatedly engaged in misconduct. 
Part III presents a new rationale for explaining the decision by governmental 
actors to provide leniency to firms engaged in misconduct. The Part argues that 
federal enforcers have, whether purposefully or not, adopted a model of 
enforcement that prioritizes gathering information from firms over levying 
significant sanctions against them. To ensure that corporations disclose 
information fully and completely, the government (i) exerts pressure to 
 
20180125-story.html [https://perma.cc/88P5-GZCN] (noting that government regulators had been 
criticized for failing to implement recommended changes to catch and correct bad practices that led to 
the Wells Fargo accounts scandal). 
 11.  See William D. Cohan, A Clue to the Scarcity of Financial Crisis Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (July 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/dealbook/a-clue-to-the-
scarcity-of-financial-crisis-prosecutions.html [https://perma.cc/46YS-WCHX] (discussing DOJ 
reluctance in prosecuting individuals for conduct responsible for the financial crisis and explaining the 
legal landscape on the issue); see also JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 19 (2017) (noting that “in response to the worst 
calamity to hit capital markets and the global economy since the Great Depression, the government did 
not charge any top bankers”). 
 12.  See Katie Benner, David Enrich & Katie Thomas, A Drug Company Wagers the U.S. Won’t Dare 
Charge It with Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/politics/teva-
antitrust-hydroxychloroquine-settlement.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/TY6X-
7UCB] (noting politics and public perception are the reasons Teva Pharmaceutical Industries believes it 
will not be charged with crimes by the federal government); Ben Protess, Robert Gebeloff & Danielle 
Ivory, Trump Administration Spares Corporate Wrongdoers Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html [https://perma.cc 
/H8FD-5P4V] (noting that since the Trump Administration took office, there has been a “62 percent 
drop in penalties” imposed by the SEC, and a “72 percent decline in corporate penalties from the [DOJ’s] 
criminal prosecutions”). See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS 
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (discussing the history leading up to and including the 
deferred prosecution approach and the various criticisms it has faced). 
 13.  See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (developing a framework for 
examining factors that make liability regimes on corporations effective). 
 14.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. 
Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder 
Memorandum on Prosecuting Corporations], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/ 
legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/G859-W8BG]. 
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incentivize firms to share information with the government, (ii) eschews 
sanctions in favor of oversight, and (iii) often sides with corporations in limiting 
the transparency of investigations into wrongdoing. 
Importantly, the idea that federal enforcers gather information is not novel. 
Professors Jennifer Arlen and Samuel Buell have explained why prosecutors 
need to rely on information from corporations about misconduct within their 
ranks.15 Professor Rory Van Loo has detailed the ways in which some federal 
enforcers—what he terms regulatory monitors, which include actors like 
Environmental Protection Agency engineers or Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau examiners—have information collection as their principal function.16 It is 
settled and accepted by both legal academics and federal enforcers that the 
transfer of information from the corporation to the government is integral to any 
federal enforcement model for a host of theoretical and practical reasons. This 
Article’s contribution, however, centers on the government’s priorities as 
evidenced by its actions, and suggests that federal enforcers’ pursuit of full and 
complete disclosure from embroiled firms colors almost all of their interactions, 
which helps explain why federal enforcers often fail to utilize the most severe 
sanctions available to them when engaging in enforcement activity. 
Part IV next considers the compliance implications of the government’s focus 
on information disclosure over a regime of robust sanctioning. When the federal 
government fails to harness and share the insights it gathers from firms’ 
disclosure of information, it wastes a unique opportunity to curb corporate 
misconduct in a broad-based manner. In short, under federal enforcers’ current 
policies and customs, they are undermining, instead of strengthening, compliance 
efforts when they prioritize the receipt of information over obtaining robust 
sanctions. Government prosecutors and regulators should consider how they 
might utilize information garnered as a result of firms’ disclosure of information 
in a manner that might improve the effectiveness of firms’ compliance efforts on 
a widespread basis. 
 
 15.  See Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global 
Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 704 (2020) (explaining that “the 
value to U.S. prosecutors of inducing corporations to investigate and provide prosecutors with 
information about misconduct rests, to a considerable degree, on a range of U.S. laws that give firms a 
comparative advantage over enforcers in gathering evidence of corporate misconduct, particularly in the 
early stages of inquiries”). 
 16.  Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
369, 369 (2019). I have written a variety of pieces on the role of monitors, which I define as “(i) an 
independent, private outsider, (ii) employed after an institution is found to have engaged in wrongdoing, 
(iii) who effectuates remediation of the institution’s misconduct, and (iv) provides information to outside 
actors about the status of the institution’s remediation efforts.” Veronica Root, Modern-Day 
Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 111 (2016). Professor Van Loo’s use of the term monitor is 
distinct from my own. 
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II 
UNWILLING ENFORCERS 
What should happen when a corporation commits a crime? This question has 
drawn the attention of scholars, governmental leaders, policymakers, and the 
public for decades. One aspect of the problem is attributable to the legal fiction 
that is the corporation—the corporation does not actually commit a crime, its 
agents do.17 This legal fiction creates tension when considering how and who or 
what to punish when misconduct occurs within a corporation. Should the 
corporation be sanctioned? Should the individuals? Both? And regardless of 
what person or entity is sanctioned, should it be severe or subject to mitigation 
or leniency? 
This Part begins by outlining the enforcement strategy government actors 
commonly employ today, which was first formally articulated by Eric Holder in 
1999 and tracks with predominant law and economics scholarship. Next, it turns 
to two traditional justifications of punishment under criminal law theory, which 
support the conclusion that much of corporate criminal enforcement today is 
concerned with achieving deterrence. The Part then provides two examples that 
demonstrate some of the tensions within the current enforcement strategy, which 
often results in an enforcement outcome where prosecutors or regulators choose 
not to utilize the full breadth of sanctions available to them. 
A. The Holder Memo and Beyond 
In 1999, then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum 
entitled “Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations.”18 Since then, 
government enforcement policy has been premised upon the idea that 
corporations can and should be held responsible for the conduct of their agents.19 
Government enforcement policy has, however, also been premised on the idea 
that corporations should receive a lesser sanction if they can demonstrate that 
they have engaged in a good faith effort to prevent misconduct within their 
ranks.20 This is often referred to as “mitigation credit.” For example, if a firm can 
show good faith by, for example, demonstrating a real commitment to 
implementing and maintaining an effective ethics and compliance program or by 
voluntarily disclosing potential misconduct to the relevant enforcement agent, 
then the sanction levied against them by the government is lessened, often 
significantly so.21 
 
 17.  See Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an 
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 393, 396 (1982) (noting that the law recognizes corporations “not as a 
natural person, but as an artificial entity. . . . [Corporations] could neither commit criminal acts . . . nor 
suffer imprisonment. [They] have no soul, and so c[an] not be blamed”). 
 18.  Holder Memorandum on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 14. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. (discussing the critical role that a corporation’s cooperation may be in “identifying 
culprits and locating relevant evidence” and how corporate “self-policing” is necessary to detect and 
prevent misconduct). 
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The principles laid out in the Holder Memorandum track quite closely to the 
arguments made by law and economics scholars during the same time period.22 
In short, because crime within a corporation will be difficult for outsiders to 
detect, it is important for firms to engage in self-policing efforts and to monitor 
the activities of their own agents. Given that individuals commit corporate crime, 
and because there will always be individuals within firms who have a taste for 
noncompliance, firms engage in some level of policing to protect themselves from 
liability.23 
If, however, the government attempted to employ an enforcement strategy of 
strict liability, law and economics scholars argue that firms would be 
disincentivized to self-police. Scholars have long argued that “if the penalties 
imposed on the firm are sufficient to deter it, then it will take internal corrective 
action to prevent misconduct by its agents for which it is legally responsible.”24 In 
other words, if the penalties levied against a firm are at an appropriate level of 
deterrence, the firm will be incentivized to effectively police the conduct of its 
employees and agents.25 Thus, law and economics scholarship supports an 
enforcement strategy that encourages self-policing while providing avenues for 
mitigation, so that firms have the ability to access a lesser set of sanctions for the 
misconduct committed by their agents. 
B. Theoretical Justifications of Punishment & the Corporation 
The traditional understandings or rationales for punishment—retributivist or 
utilitarian26—can be difficult to trace onto crime committed by the corporation. 
A retributivist “claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it.”27 
In the context of corporate crime, however, a retributivist rationale for 
punishment is difficult to justify, because the corporation is at the mercy of, and 
is held liable for the actions of, its agents. This is true even when the interests of 
a firm’s agent who chooses to engage in criminal activity fails to align with the 
interests of the corporation itself, for example, when the agent’s criminal activity 
is in fact harmful to the firm.28 Whether a corporation deserves punishment, in 
the retributivist sense, is often a difficult question to answer, particularly because 
the punishment levied on a corporation will often impact individuals beyond the 
corporation itself, like shareholders or other stakeholders, such as employees.29 
 
 22.  See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 735–36 (arguing that the best liability regime will deter 
corporate crime by allowing good faith self-policing of wrongdoing to mitigate the sanctions imposed 
against the corporation). 
 23.  See id. at 693 (“[E]ntity liability can induce the firm to undertake a variety of actions that 
increase the probability that wayward agents will be sanctioned, which we term ‘policing measures.’”). 
 24.  John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 407–08 (1981) (citing RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 165–67 (2d ed. 1977)). 
 25.  Id. at 408. 
 26.  Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347–53 (1983). 
 27.  Id. at 347. 
 28.  Coffee, supra note 24, at 393–94. 
 29.  Id. at 401–02. 
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A utilitarian “believes that justification for punishment lies in the useful 
purposes that punishment serves.”30 And scholars and policymakers have 
typically relied upon such utilitarian rationales when thinking through 
mechanisms for dealing with corporate misconduct. In particular, the rationales 
for corporate criminal liability have focused significantly on the importance of 
deterrence—“[k]nowledge that punishment will follow crime deters [firms] from 
committing crimes, thus reducing future violations . . . .”31 The Holder 
Memorandum exemplifies the focus on deterrence, noting that “a corporate 
indictment may result in specific deterrence by changing the culture of the 
indicted corporation and the behavior of its employees.”32 Additionally, the law 
and economics rationales that support the awarding of mitigation credit are 
based, at least in part, on deterrence rationales. For example, Professors Jennifer 
Arlen and Reinier Kraakman’s seminal article explains that “strict vicarious 
liability may not be the best regime for inducing the firm to implement optimal 
deterrence measures.”33 
Importantly, when a firm is punished for misconduct, it also has a spillover 
effect on those who observe the punishment being levied. Thus, the punishment 
creates a broad, general deterrent for not just the entity that engaged in 
wrongdoing, but also for those who might be tempted to participate in similar 
types of misconduct.34 The Holder Memorandum explains that “prosecutors 
should be aware of the important public benefits that may flow from indicting a 
corporation in appropriate cases. . . . [A]n indictment often provides a unique 
opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.”35 When a corporate offender is 
indicted, it sends a signal to other corporations to be on alert for similar 
misconduct within their own ranks, as it could result in criminal prosecution 
levied against the firm. Thus, the government has a variety of reasons to engage 
in corporate criminal prosecutions to ensure that it is effectively deterring 
corporations from engaging in misconduct. 
And yet, the Holder Memorandum also reflects a fair amount of dissonance 
with the idea of sanctioning corporate offenders aggressively. It begins by stating: 
“Vigorous enforcement of the criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers, where 
appropriate, results in great benefits for law enforcement and the public.”36 But 
it goes on to explain a variety of factors prosecutors should consider when 
determining whether and how to charge a corporation, including the possibility 
that individual employees may take actions that are in contravention of the 
corporation’s instructions, requirements, and goals.37 It then acknowledges the 
 
 30.  Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 347. 
 31.  Id. at 351. 
 32.  Holder Memorandum on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 14. 
 33.  Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 691. 
 34.  Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 351. 
 35.  Holder Memorandum on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 14. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
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following: “In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor 
is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the 
corporation itself. . . . Accordingly, a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in 
identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence.”38 Thus, the Holder 
Memorandum touts the importance of sanctioning corporate offenders in a 
significant way, but then quickly concedes that the government is likely ill-
equipped to engage in effective investigations into corporate misconduct without 
the corporation’s cooperation. Government enforcers are constantly negotiating 
the tension between these two positions. 
C. Tensions Within Reduced Sanctions 
Much progress has been made within compliance efforts since the release of 
the Holder Memorandum in 1999, which invigorated the prosecution of 
corporations for white collar crimes, and the 2003 Thompson Memorandum,39 
which emphasized the importance of a firm’s cooperation with law enforcement 
and the implementation of “effective rather than mere paper [compliance] 
programs.”40 When federal prosecutors and regulators purposefully choose to 
pursue something less than the most severe of sanctions, it often leads many to 
question the adequacy of the governmental response to corporate misconduct. 
Judges,41 scholars,42 and the public43 are often dissatisfied with the government’s 
method of punishment, or lack thereof, towards the firm that has engaged in 
misconduct. 
The most common form of sanction levied against corporations for 
misconduct, fines, are often not seen as the most serious punishment that can be 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], 
[https://perma.cc/9FY9-CAR4]; see discussion infra note 84. 
 40.  Alan Vinegrad, Deferred Prosecution of Corporations, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 2003, 
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2003/10/oid26786.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C3M 
-537N]. 
 41. 41. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated 
and remanded, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting a ruling from the district court refusing to approve 
a settlement between the SEC and the defendant and remanding for the district court to consider whether 
the public interest would be disserved by entry of the consent decree); United States v. HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (“Just as a non-prosecution 
agreement is perceived as a public relations benefit to a company, perhaps the filing and maintenance of 
criminal charges was intended to produce a public relations benefit for the government. . . . [A] pending 
federal criminal case is not window dressing.”). 
 42.  See Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1057–58 
(2017); See generally, GARRETT, supra note 12 (detailing the ways in which prosecutors compromise with 
corporations and fail to hold corporations fully accountable for their misconduct). 
 43.  See, e.g., EISINGER, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that after the 2008 financial crisis “[t]he public 
was furious . . . and lack of consequences for bankers radicalized both ends of the political spectrum and 
gave rise to two of the most potent social movements of our time: the Tea Party and Occupy Wall 
Street”). 
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imposed upon a corporation, and their limitations have long been recognized.44 
Indeed, non-monetary penalties are often seen as potentially having greater 
deterrence power than monetary penalties.45 This Part discusses two types of non-
monetary penalties that are often considered to be more severe than the 
imposition of fines alone, specifically (i) debarment and (ii) disqualifications. In 
each example, the government actor responsible for crafting the enforcement 
response to misconduct at the firm in question explicitly rejected an available 
non-monetary penalty. 
1. Debarment 
When corporations enter into guilty pleas with the government, they can be 
subject to a variety of collateral consequences. For companies with businesses 
that are dependent upon government contracting, one potentially severe 
collateral consequence is debarment. For example, “[u]nder federal guidelines 
governing procurement, an individual or company that violates the [Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)] or other criminal statutes may be barred from 
doing business with the federal government.”46 On more than one occasion, 
however, the government has chosen not to pursue a guilty plea from a 
corporation engaged in repeated instances of misconduct, while explicitly noting 
that to do so would result in debarment. In other words, the government 
purposefully made decisions about the appropriate enforcement strategy against 
a recidivist corporation for the express purpose of avoiding the collateral 
consequence of debarment. 
For example, Biomet47 entered into deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) 
in 200748 and 201249 for various incidents involving unlawful payments and bribes. 
 
 44.  Coffee, supra note 24, at 388–89. But see Arlen & Buell, supra note 15, at n.7 (explaining that 
small owner-managed firms often cannot survive if required to pay the large monetary fines associated 
with negotiated settlement agreements). 
 45.  See Root, supra note 42, at 1040–45 (explaining types of non-monetary penalties that firms may 
find more distasteful than monetary penalties). 
 46.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENF’T DIV., FCPA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 70 (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E59-HFQ9]. 
 47.  Biomet was acquired by Zimmer Holdings, Inc. in June 2015, and is now known as Zimmer 
Biomet. Press Release, Zimmer Holdings, Inc., Zimmer Completes Combination with Biomet (June 24, 
2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/zimmer-completes-combination-with-biomet-
300104244.html [https://perma.cc/75ZR-97WQ]. For ease of reading, this Article will refer to the 
company as Biomet throughout. 
 48.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry 
Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/hips0927.rel.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6M2T -B3HP] (explaining that the government was willing to enter into a DPA with Biomet due to their 
“commitment to changing its previous practices . . . .”). 
 49.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Third Medical Device Company Resolves Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-
company-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation [https://perma.cc/JFR5-55Y4] (“Biomet 
Inc. has entered into a [DPA] with the Department of Justice to resolve improper payments by the 
company and its subsidiaries in violation of the [FCPA] . . . .”). 
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In conjunction with the 2007 settlement, which included monetary penalties in 
the amount of $26.9 million,50 Biomet entered into a five-year Corporate Integrity 
Agreement with the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of Inspector General. The agreement stated that if Biomet materially 
breached the agreement51 and did not cure the breach within thirty days, it could 
be excluded from future participation in federal health care programs52—that is, 
suffer debarment. The DOJ’s decision to enter into yet another DPA in 2012, 
which included a monetary penalty of $22.8 million,53 was influenced by the fact 
that if it were “to initiate a prosecution of Biomet and obtain a conviction . . . 
Biomet would potentially be subject to exclusion from participation in federal 
health care programs.”54 This is because companies that have been convicted of 
felonies related to health care fraud or crimes related to federal health care 
programs are required to be excluded from participation in any federal health 
care program.55 
Thus, Biomet dodged possible debarment in both 2007 and 2012.56 Yet in 
2014, despite no mention of debarment, Biomet entered into another settlement 
agreement with the DOJ—paying over $6 million—concerning allegations that a 
 
 50.  See Edith Honan, Device Makers to Pay $311 mln to Settle Kickbacks Probe, REUTERS (Sept. 
27, 2007), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-medicaldevices-fraud/device-makers-to-pay-311-mln-to-
settle-kickbacks-probe-idUSN2735855720070927 [https://perma.cc/CNE7-ERHU] (explaining that 
Biomet will pay a $26.9 million civil settlement and avoid criminal prosecution by agreeing to reforms). 
 51.  The Corporate Integrity Agreement defined material breach as: (i) any failure to report and 
take corrective action regarding any “probable violation of criminal, civil, or administrative laws 
applicable to any Federal health care program for which penalties or exclusion may be authorized” and 
bankruptcy filing; (ii) “repeated or flagrant violation[s] of the obligations under this [Corporate Integrity 
Agreement]”; (iii) failure to respond to payment notices of the stipulated damages owed; and (iv) failure 
to engage the independent review organization required under the agreement. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND 
BIOMET, INC. 19, 31 (Sept. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Biomet CIA], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default 
/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/BiometCIA92707.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MAU-SYPY]. 
 52.  Biomet CIA, supra note 51, at 31–32. 
 53.  Richard L. Cassin, Biomet Pays $22.8 Million to Settle Bribe Charges, THE FCPA BLOG (Mar. 
26, 2012, 4:08 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2012/03/26/biomet-pays-228-million-to-settle-bribe-charges/ 
[https://perma.cc/EQ6H-8M4A]. 
 54.  Letter from Jeffrey Knox, Principal Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, and Kathleen M. Hamann, Trial Att’y, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Laurence Urgenson and Asheesh Goel, Couns. for Biomet, Inc., at 3 (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/biomet/2012-03-26-biomet-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FTJ3-W2H4]. 
 55.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2012). 
 56.  Also note that in March 2015, the DOJ notified Biomet that it was extending the 2012 DPA for 
one year in response to Biomet’s notification to the DOJ of additional “alleged improprieties regarding 
its operations in Brazil and Mexico.” Biomet, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351346/000090342315000219/biomet-8k_0317.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/6E63-9384]; see also Samuel Rubenfeld, The Morning Risk Report: Biomet Hit by Recidivism, 
WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:25 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/ 
2015/03/19/the-morning-risk-report-biomet-hit-by-bribery-recidivism [https://perma.cc/N9T4-V6MG] 
(noting that the DOJ can extend the term of a DPA while investigating a breach and can impose 
additional penalties or remedial measures). 
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subsidiary paid kickbacks to physicians in an effort to induce them to order the 
subsidiary’s bone growth stimulator.57 Finally, in 2017, Biomet,58 entered into yet 
another DPA as a result of alleged unlawful bribery in violation of the FCPA and 
agreed to pay $30.5 million “to resolve DOJ and [Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)] investigations into the company’s ‘repeat’ violations of the 
[FCPA].”59 The government allowed Biomet to enter into this agreement even 
while noting that Biomet “allowed the bribes to continue” and “disregard[ed] its 
obligations under the earlier [DPA].”60 
Thus, over an approximately ten-year period, Biomet was found to have 
engaged in repeated instances of wrongdoing. Monetary fines were levied of over 
$200 million, yet federal prosecutors refused to pursue a guilty plea out of 
concern that Biomet would then be subject to the collateral consequence of 
debarment. 
2. Disqualifications 
When financial institutions violate certain federal securities laws, they are 
subject to regulatory disqualifications. Disqualifications are harmful for a variety 
of reasons. For example, a firm with a status of well-known seasoned issuer 
(WKSI) “enjoys significant advantages in offering its securities under the 
Securities Act of 1933.”61 Firms can, however, be automatically disqualified from 
receiving WKSI status if they engaged in misconduct: “[I]t is generally 
understood that the purpose of automatic disqualification provisions is to punish 
bad actors by preventing them from relying on certain accommodations provided 
 
 57.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Biomet Companies to Pay Over $6 Million to Resolve False 
Claims Act Allegations Concerning Bone Growth Stimulators (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/biomet-companies-pay-over-6-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-concerning-bone 
[https://perma.cc/6SR8-HKSD]. Also during 2014, Biomet settled a civil lawsuit regarding a defective hip 
device, agreeing to pay at least $56 million. Reuters Staff, Biomet Reaches $56 Million Settlement Over 
Faulty Hip Replacements, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-biomet-
settlement/biomet-reaches-56-million-settlement-over-faulty-hip-replacements-
idUSBREA1305Y20140204 [https://perma.cc/674D-CT6B]. 
 58.  Now operating as Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Zimmer 
Biomet Holdings Inc. Agrees to Pay $17.4 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges 
(Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Biomet Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/zimmer-biomet-
holdings-inc-agrees-pay-174-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/3MSF-
LMV6]. 
 59.  Richard L. Cassin, Zimmer Biomet Holdings Pays $30 Million to Resolve New FCPA Charges, 
THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 12, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2017/01/12/zimmer-biomet-holdings-
pays-30-million-to-resolve-new-fcpa-c/ [https://perma.cc/LSM3-SY4K]. 
 60.  2017 Biomet Press Release, supra note 58. The government did not, however, refer to the other 
instances of unlawful bribery resulting in enforcement actions brought against the company in 2007 and 
2014. Additionally, there was no mention of sanctions that may ultimately lead to debarment. 
 61.  Michael T. Rave, Advantages of Being a Well-Known Seasoned Issuer, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2013), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/477751/advantages-of-being-a-well-known-seasoned-issuer [https:// 
perma.cc/Q4WX-ZTR4]. 
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in the securities laws.”62 As explained by then-Commissioner Daniel Gallagher 
in 2015: 
A common thread runs through the legislative and SEC records underlying each of 
these disqualification provisions: Congress and the SEC may be willing to allow for 
exemptions from otherwise applicable restrictions or burdens, but only to those persons 
who are unlikely to abuse that relief through fraudulent or other improper conduct. . . . 
Historically, the Commission and the staff have approached the disqualification and 
waiver process against the backdrop of the first policy goal of reducing recidivism.63 
In response to these disqualifications, however, an entity can request that the 
SEC issue a waiver.64 Financial institutions or entities that request a waiver have 
the burden of showing “good cause” for a waiver to be granted.65 For instance, in 
determining whether “good cause” for a WKSI waiver has been satisfied, the 
SEC looks at “how the conduct that gave rise to the ineligibility related to the 
reliability of the issuer’s current and future disclosure, and if it does, what steps 
the issuer has taken to remediate any deficiencies.”66 Moreover, the SEC looks 
at whether granting the waiver would be in line with “the public interest or the 
protection of investors.”67 
The application of WKSI waivers to banks engaged in the LIBOR scandal 
provides an example of how the government allows entities engaged in long-term 
misconduct to avoid certain collateral consequences. In April 2015, DB Group 
Services, Ltd., a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank, pleaded guilty to wire fraud with 
regards to its manipulation of LIBOR and agreed to pay a $150 million fine.68 
Deutsche Bank entered into a DPA, admitted to manipulating LIBOR and 
 
 62.  Richard A. Rosen & David S. Huntington, Waivers from the Automatic Disqualification 
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SECS. L. ADVISOR, August 2015, at 2, 3. 
 63.  Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 37th Annual 
Conference on Securities Regulation and Business Law: Why is the SEC Wavering on Waivers? (Feb. 
13, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/021315-spc-cdmg.html [https:// 
perma.cc/EJE2-L38B]). 
 64.  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement on Enhancing the 
Commission’s Waiver Process (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/aguilar-enhancing-
commissions-waiver-process.html [https://perma.cc/Q42F-QWJV]. When requesting a waiver, the entity 
should provide the Commission with the necessary background information, legal and factual issues that 
are involved, and the entity’s suggested grounds for granting the waiver. Process for Requesting Waivers 
of “Bad Actor” Disqualification Under Rule 262 of Regulation A and Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/262-505-
waiver.htm [https://perma.cc/TTA9-SCMX]. 
 65.  Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Corporate Counsel Institute, 
Georgetown University in Washington D.C.: Understanding Disqualifications, Exemptions and Waivers 
Under the Federal Securities Laws (Mar. 12, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/031215-spch-cmjw.html [https://perma.cc/592W-D8WL]). 
 66.  Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement on WKSI Waivers 
(Apr. 29, 2014), at n.1, https://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541680627 [https:// 
perma.cc/9UZ3-8XPN]. 
 67.  Id.; see also White, supra note 65 (“[T]he Commission’s ultimate objective is for the waiver 
decision to safeguard the public interest and protect investors.”). 
 68.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty 
in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov 
/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation 
[https://perma.cc/3CH9-2VMF]. 
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conspiring to price-fix with other banks, agreed to a monetary penalty of $625 
million, promised continued cooperation with the DOJ during its investigation of 
LIBOR manipulation, and agreed to retain a corporate monitor for the duration 
of the three-year agreement.69 Deutsche Bank also paid penalties of $800 million 
to the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission and $600 million 
to the New York Department of Financial Services.70 
As a result of the criminal conviction of its subsidiary, Deutsche Bank was to 
lose its WKSI status.71 The SEC, however, granted Deutsche Bank a waiver, over 
the emphatic objection of one of its commissioners, who explained: 
 Deutsche Bank’s illegal conduct involved nearly a decade of lying, cheating, and 
stealing. This criminal conduct was pervasive and widespread, involving dozens of 
employees from Deutsche Bank offices including New York, Frankfurt, Tokyo, and 
London. Deutsche Bank’s traders engaged in a brazen scheme to defraud Deutsche 
Bank’s counterparties and the worldwide financial marketplace by secretly 
manipulating LIBOR. The conduct is appalling. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . Among other factors, the egregious criminal nature of the conduct and the 
duration of the manipulation (almost a decade) weigh heavily in my mind when 
considering this waiver. Additionally, Deutsche Bank is a recidivist, and its past conduct 
undermines its current promise of future good conduct. . . . 
 . . . I do not find any basis to support the assertion that Deutsche Bank’s culture of 
compliance is dependable, or that its future disclosures will be accurate and reliable.72 
Stein’s dissenting comments go on to demonstrate a concern about the ability of 
the SEC to incentivize firms to adopt an effective compliance program, when they 
are aware they may be able to avoid significant sanctions.73 
The decision to grant Deutsche Bank a waiver was not an isolated incident. 
Indeed, it was the second bank involved with manipulation of LIBOR to receive 
a waiver to having its WKSI status revoked.74 Less than three weeks after Stein 
published her dissent in the Deutsche Bank matter, the SEC granted waivers to 
three other banks—UBS, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland—that had been 
involved in both the LIBOR scandal as well as a “criminal conspiracy to 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of 
Deutsche Bank AG, Regarding WKSI (May 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-
statement-deutsche-bank-ag-wksi.html (explaining that, absent a waiver granted by the Commission, the 
criminal conviction of Deutsche Bank’s subsidiary would trigger ineligible issuer status). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group, plc, Securities Act Release No. 9578, Exchange Act 
Release No. 72032, 108 SEC Docket 15 (Apr. 25, 2014) (granting Royal Bank of Scotland a waiver from 
being considered an ineligible issuer); see also Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Dissenting Statement in the Matter of The Royal Bank of Scotland Group, plc, Regarding Order Under 
Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933, Granting a Waiver From Being an Ineligible Issuer (Apr. 28, 
2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541670244 [https://perma.cc/4S8Z-
REDH] (noting how frequently the SEC has granted WKSI waivers to large financial institutions and 
broker-dealers). 
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manipulate exchange rates in the foreign currency exchange spot market . . . a 
global market for buying and selling currencies.”75 
* * * * 
This Part highlights two instances where the government actor rejected an 
available non-monetary penalty that could have had an important deterrent 
impact on the firm. In a perfect world, fines would be levied against firms at 
amounts that would sufficiently deter them from misconduct, but the realities of 
the government’s enforcement efforts over the past two decades make clear that 
the optimal level of fines is often not sought by government enforcers. This is 
evidenced by the repeat misconduct one can see within firms, like Biomet and 
others.76 In a world where the monetary penalties levied are not sufficient on their 
own to deter crime, non-monetary penalties are of even greater importance. 
When those non-monetary penalties are not pursued,77 it leads to a situation 
where corporate crime is insufficiently deterred. The question, therefore, is why 
might the government pursue an enforcement strategy of this nature? 
III 
THE PUSH FOR INFORMATION 
When one looks at the treatment of Biomet, Deutsche Bank, and other firms78 
that have engaged in repeated incidents of misconduct,79 it is easy to understand 
 
 75.  See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement Regarding 
Certain Waivers Granted by the Commission for Certain Entities Pleading Guilty to Criminal Charges 
Involving Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Rates (May 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
statement/stein-waivers-granted-dissenting-statement.html [https://perma.cc/4Y67-B28G] (dissenting to 
the Commission granting UBS, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland waivers on May 20, 2015, and 
noting the recidivism of the institutions). 
 76.  See Root, supra note 42 (discussing corporate repeat offenders and arguing in favor of an 
increase in non-monetary penalties to deter misconduct). 
 77.  This Article highlights two non-monetary penalties that are not being utilized by the 
government—debarment and disqualification—but there are others. For example, the DOJ’s use of 
monitors as part of corporate criminal resolutions has declined over the past few years. 2020 Mid-Year 
Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, GIBSON 
DUNN (July 15, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2020-mid-year-npa-dpa-update/ [https://perma.cc 
/RH3B-F4RB] (noting that as of mid-year 2020, the “DOJ has not imposed any independent compliance 
monitors” and has instead “relied heavily on self-reporting”). 
 78.  Indeed, in 2011, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) entered into a DPA for alleged violations of the 
FCPA. One of the government’s listed considerations for entering into the DPA was its concern that if 
the DOJ were “to initiate a prosecution of J&J or one of its operating companies and obtain a conviction, 
instead of entering into this DPA, J&J could be subject to exclusion from participation in federal health 
care programs.” Letter from Paul Pelletier, Principal Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., and Kathleen M. Hamann, Trial Att’y, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Eric 
Dubelier, Reed Smith LLP, Couns. for Johnson & Johnson (Jan. 14, 2011), https://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/04/27/04-08-11depuy-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NHJ-
E9UT]. And like Biomet, J&J went on to commit additional instances of unlawful off-label marketing 
and kickbacks to physicians and pharmacists. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Johnson & Johnson to 
Pay More than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-
investigations [https://perma.cc/FCV8-GXJN]. 
 79.  See Root, supra note 42, at 1005–08 (detailing instances of repeat misconduct at HSBC entities). 
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why so many are concerned with the possibility that federal prosecutors and 
regulators are unwilling to enforce the laws broken by corporate offenders.80 
Indeed, to rephrase a reporter’s 2017 insight, have “[t]oday’s Department of 
Justice [and federal regulators] lost the will and indeed the ability to go after the 
highest-ranking corporate wrongdoers”?81 
This Part puts forth the thesis of this Article, arguing that federal enforcers 
have, whether purposefully or not,82 adopted a model of enforcement that 
prioritizes gathering information from firms over levying significant sanctions 
against them. Instead of pursuing one of the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution or deterrence—the government’s actions suggest that its priority is in 
ensuring that corporations fully disclose all relevant information of the 
corporation’s misconduct to the government. This Part demonstrates how the 
government ensures firms disclose information by (A) exerting formal pressure 
to incentivize firms to share information with the government, (B) eschewing 
sanctions in favor of oversight, and (C) siding with corporations in limiting the 
transparency of investigations into wrongdoing. 
A. Formal Pressure 
Since the Holder Memorandum was issued in 1999, a variety of other 
guidance has been issued from the DOJ, which has often attempted to provide 
pressure or incentives to ensure that a corporation will provide large amounts of 
information about the underlying misconduct, the firm’s internal investigation, 
and any remediation efforts undertaken or planned. As discussed above, the 
Holder Memorandum noted the need for cooperation from the corporation when 
attempting to detect, investigate, or remediate misconduct within the firm, and 
noted that a corporation’s willingness to assist with the government investigation 
may be relevant to a prosecutor’s ultimate charging decision.83 In other words, 
cooperation via information disclosure might lead to less severe charges. 
 
 80.  See White, supra note 65 (“[T]he Commission’s decisions to grant or deny exemptions or waivers 
from regulatory disqualifications have been part of a broader public dialogue about the sufficiency of 
sanctions against entities that engage in wrongdoing.”); see also EISINGER, supra note 11, at 22 (“Today’s 
Department of Justice has lost the will and indeed the ability to go after the highest-ranking corporate 
wrongdoers.”); Renae Merle, Repeat Offenders: Corporate Misdeeds Often Settled with Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
2019/09/26/repeat-offenders-corporate-misdeeds-often-settled-with-deferred-prosecution-agreements/ 
[https://perma.cc/W79T-JDQP] (noting that “[s]ince 1992, the Justice Department has entered 535 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporations” which has emboldened 
corporate crime). 
 81.  EISINGER, supra note 11, at 22. 
 82.  It is important to remember that decisions prosecutors make in individual cases may not always 
be a result of the government’s overall enforcement policy and may, instead, be attributable to a 
particular line prosecutor’s attempt to balance resource constraints with the need for holding corporate 
defendants accountable in a tangible manner. 
 83.  See Holder Memorandum on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 14 (explaining that a non-
prosecution agreement may be permitted in exchange for cooperation when a firm’s “‘timely cooperation 
appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are 
unavailable or would not be effective’”); see also Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance 
04 - MARTINEZ - INFORMATION OVER SANCTION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2021 12:36 PM 
100 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:85 
In 2003, the DOJ attempted to ramp up the pressure and issued the 
Thompson Memorandum.84 In order for a corporation to claim that it was 
cooperating, the Thompson Memorandum required companies to (i) turn over 
materials from their internal investigations, (ii) waive any attorney-client 
privilege related to the underlying misconduct, and (iii) decline to provide an 
executive targeted for prosecution with a company-paid lawyer.85 This attempt at 
aggressively pressuring companies to engage in cooperation and information 
disclosure—even the disclosure of privileged information—failed in 2006, when 
(i) a federal judge determined that the application of the Thompson 
Memorandum in a criminal case against ex-executives of KPMG violated their 
constitutional rights to counsel and fundamental fairness in a criminal 
proceeding,86 and (ii) hearings before the United States Senate raised significant 
questions, from the American Bar Association and the white collar defense bar, 
about the requirement for firms to waive the attorney-client privilege.87 
After the hearings, legislation was proposed to prohibit much of the most 
controversial aspects of the Thompson Memorandum, and new guidance, the 
McNulty Memorandum,88 was issued shortly afterwards in December 2006. The 
McNulty Memorandum walked back much of the disputed policies within the 
Thompson Memorandum.89 And yet, even while walking back the more 
 
Investigations, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259 (2020) (explaining that a firm with an effective compliance 
program will receive lesser sanctions than a firm that does not have an effective compliance program). 
 84.  See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 39 (noting the focus of the memorandum’s revision to 
DOJ corporate crime policy is to increase “emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s 
cooperation”). 
 85.  Id. at 7. 
 86.  United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated sub nom. on other 
grounds, Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he government violated the rights of the 
KPMG Defendants to due process and to the assistance of counsel by interfering with KPMG’s 
advancement of legal fees and other defense costs.”). 
 87.  See The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary¸109th Cong. 22–36, (2007) (statements of Karen J. Mathis, 
President, American Bar Association, Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP, and Mark B. 
Sheppard, Partner, Sprague & Sprague) (explaining concerns about policies which lead the waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege and work product privilege); see also Ashby Jones, Thompson Memo Out, 
McNulty Memo In, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2006, 1:27 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2006/12/12/thompson-memo-out-mcnulty-memo-in/ [https://perma.cc/L7DM-FBQB] (“The Thompson 
memo was pointedly criticized by business groups and civil liberties organizations, who claimed that it 
eviscerated individuals [sic] constitutional rights.”). 
 88. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Components and United States Att’ys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QQG9-R3ZB] 
 89. See’’’ Id. at 10 (noting that waiving attorney-client and work product protections is no longer “a 
prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated in the government’s investigation”); see also 
Department of Justice McNulty Memo Curtails Controversial Portions of Thompson Memo—Legislation 
Introduced in the Senate, WILMERHALE (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/ 
publications/department-of-justice-mcnulty-memo-curtails-controversial-portions-of-thompson-memo-
legislation-introduced-in-the-senate-december-13-2006 [https://perma.cc/FK6H-7HQP] (“[C]urrent 
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued his own memorandum scaling back the more egregious 
aspects of the Thompson Memorandum.”). 
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draconian aspects of the Thompson Memorandum, the McNulty Memorandum 
continued to espouse the government’s desire for information. For example, the 
new guidance “expand[ed] upon the Department’s long-standing policies 
concerning how [it] evaluate[s] the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation 
with a government investigation.”90 Additionally, while the DOJ stopped 
requiring waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the McNulty Memorandum 
explained that “a company’s disclosure of privileged information may permit the 
government to expedite its investigation. In addition, the disclosure of privileged 
information may be critical in enabling the government to evaluate the accuracy 
and completeness of the company’s voluntary disclosure.”91 
The McNulty Memorandum, however, was also short-lived and was 
superseded by the Filip Memorandum in 2008.92 The Filip Memorandum moved 
even further away than the McNulty Memorandum from requiring firms to waive 
the attorney-client privilege.93 Instead, the Filip Memorandum focused on 
corporations disclosing relevant facts to the government to obtain cooperation 
credit. Specifically, the Filip memorandum stated: “[T]he sort of cooperation that 
is most valuable to resolving allegations of misconduct by a corporation and its 
officers, directors, employees, or agents is disclosure of the relevant facts 
concerning such misconduct.”94 
In 2015, the DOJ issued the Yates Memorandum, which focused on 
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”95 Similar to the Filip 
Memorandum, the Yates Memorandum states that “in order to qualify for any 
cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant 
 
 90.  McNulty Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2. 
 91.  Id. at 10. 
 92.  Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. 
Att’ys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JZN-76XV]. 
 93.  Even as the government retreated from its more aggressive positions, like overt attempts to 
obtain privilege waivers, many still believe the government holds a significant coercive power over 
corporations just by virtue of the reputational harms that might occur if the government brings civil and 
criminal proceedings against the corporation. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 29 (2016) (discussing the BP oil spill and 
explaining “[t]he Justice Department held a sword over the company’s fictive neck: the threat of full 
criminal prosecution and parallel civil enforcement lawsuits for every possible violation in the sprawling 
federal code”). Others, however, have argued that firms obtain a reputational benefit by working with 
the government, by demonstrating to consumers and the public that it is trying to change and correct 
misconduct from within by being transparent with the entities charged with investigating them. See Mark 
Robeck, Amy Vazquez & Michael E. Clark, Corporate Cooperation in the Face of Government 
Investigations, HEALTH LAW., Apr. 2005, at 20, 24 (“An internal investigation ferreting out wrongdoers 
may help the corporation’s reputation.”). 
 94.  Filip Memorandum, supra note 92, at 9. 
 95.  Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Assistant 
Att’ys Gen. for U.S. Dep’t of Just.’s Antitrust, Civ., Crim., Env’t & Nat. Res., Nat’l Sec., & Tax Divs., 
Dirs. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Exec. Off. for U.S. Trs., and U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yates Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https:// 
perma.cc/69BS-S5KW]. 
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facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct.”96 The Yates 
Memorandum was swiftly condemned by the white-collar bar for, amongst other 
concerns, creating potential conflicts between corporations charged with 
investigating wrongdoing and the employees and other agents who were aware 
of relevant information.97 
Further, in 2018, then-Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein walked 
back the requirements of the Yates Memorandum in a speech, announcing that 
corporations would be permitted to receive cooperation credit as long as they 
identified individuals that played a significant role “in setting a company on a 
course of criminal conduct.”98 Rosenstein noted, however, that if the DOJ were 
to find “that a company is not operating in good faith to identify individuals who 
were substantially involved in or responsible for wrongdoing, [then the DOJ] will 
not award any cooperation credit.”99 
Thus, while the mechanism of the DOJ’s pressure changed and at times 
lessened—due to objections from Congress, the American Bar Association, and 
the white-collar bar—the DOJ has consistently engaged in efforts to incentivize 
firms to provide fulsome information to the government in the twenty years since 
the Holder Memorandum was introduced. Importantly, the DOJ is not alone in 
its efforts to use pressure to ensure it receives the information it seeks; regulators 
also encourage information disclosure in a variety of ways. For example, in 2002, 
the SEC issued the Seaboard Report, which indicated that firms could 
demonstrate their willingness to cooperate by waiving their attorney-client 
privilege.100 The upshot is that both prosecutors and regulators put a high-priority 
on obtaining a significant amount of information from firms found to have 
engaged in wrongdoing, and they have done so for two decades. 
 
 96.  Id. at 2. 
 97.  See Unpacking the Yates Memo: What the “New” DOJ Policy Really Means, MCGUIREWOODS 
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2015/9/Unpacking-Yates-
Memo-New-DOJ-Policy [https://perma.cc/36QW-SWUW] (explaining that the Yates Memo will likely 
make “it more difficult for companies and their counsel to secure unfettered cooperation from executives 
in internal investigations”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal 
Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation 
as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 
(2015) (noting a variety of potential deficiencies with the Yates memorandum that might not actually 
lead to greater individual prosecutions). 
 98.  Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the American 
Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 
2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-
rosenstein-delivers-remarks-american-conference-institute-0 [https://perma.cc/Q49B-SEZN]). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 and Comm’n 
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enf’t Decisions, Securities Act Release No. 
44,969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma.cc/Q9M3-AARR]. 
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B. Oversight 
The official pressure levied by federal prosecutors and regulators, however, 
is not the only way in which the government has made clear that its priority in 
corporate criminal enforcement is to obtain information. Federal prosecutors and 
regulators have also employed a variety of ways to require formal oversight and 
a reporting of firms’ remediation efforts after reaching a resolution—whether 
that be a DPA, a non-prosecution agreement, or a guilty plea—for the 
misconduct that occurred. Indeed, as the DOJ walked back many of the 
requirements found within the Thompson Memorandum, it was simultaneously 
experimenting with a variety of “post-resolution oversight” strategies that would 
enable it to continue to receive information regarding firms’ investigative and 
remediation efforts.101 
Take, for example, the DOJ’s resolution of FCPA cases from 2005 to 2014, 
around the time the Thompson Memorandum was being criticized and phased 
out by the McNulty and Filip Memorandums. During that time, “approximately 
three out of every five corporate FCPA resolutions . . . required some form of 
ongoing reporting or monitoring of the company’s compliance program during a 
post-resolution period.”102 This post-resolution monitoring took three basic 
forms: (i) an external monitor required to provide regular reports regarding the 
firm’s progress on its remediation efforts (2005–2014),103 (ii) a self-assessment 
period by the firm with regular reports to the DOJ on its progress (2007, 2009–
2014), and (iii) a hybrid of these two, where a monitor was utilized for a specified 
time period followed by a self-assessment period (2012–2014).104 Thus, the DOJ 
included additional guarantees within its enforcement resolutions to ensure 
corporations found to have engaged in misconduct would continue to provide the 
government with information regarding the firm’s investigation and resolution of 
the relevant matters. 
Importantly, regulators also use post-resolution oversight of firms’ 
remediation efforts and began to do so more routinely and aggressively over the 
past twenty years. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
utilized external monitors for over a decade to oversee remediation efforts to 
comply with Commission orders.105 In explaining the importance of monitors to 
these situations, an FTC publication states that “these complex remedies 
typically require significant, and often highly technical, post-order cooperation 
and commitment from the merged entity.”106 
 
 101.  2014 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 FCPA Update], 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2014-year-end-fcpa-update/ [https://perma.cc/G5AS-ZTYR]. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Monitorships take a variety of forms, but those arising out of FCPA matters tend to be corporate 
compliance monitorships. Root, supra note 16, at 111. 
 104.  2014 FCPA Update, supra note 102. 
 105.  Susan Huber, Monitors: Expert Eyes and Ears in Commission Orders, FTC: COMPETITION 
MATTERS (July 14, 2015, 11:59 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/ 
2015/07/monitors-expert-eyes-ears-commission-orders [https://perma.cc/RJ6X-63YH]. 
 106.  Id. 
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The upshot is that federal enforcers have continuously sought ways to 
maintain oversight over a firm found to have engaged in alleged wrongdoing for 
a period of time after entering into a resolution with the firm. 
C. Limited Transparency 
Federal prosecutors and regulators have demonstrated through their policy 
pronouncements and oversight mechanisms that a firm’s disclosure of 
information is important to them. But the most persuasive evidence of the federal 
government’s desire to obtain complete and fulsome information from corporate 
offenders is its willingness to fight on their behalf to keep that information secret. 
In case after case, the government demonstrates it is willing to withhold 
information from the public to ensure that corporations maintain their 
willingness to continue working with the government. 
For example, in 2004, the SEC and AIG entered into a consent order 
regarding AIG’s alleged improper accounting and financial reporting. The 
consent order required AIG to retain a monitor, who would provide reports to 
the SEC, the DOJ, and AIG’s internal audit committee.107 In June 2006, AIG and 
the SEC filed a motion with the district court to have the monitor’s reports 
prohibited from being subject to public dissemination.108 In 2011, a reporter 
attempted to gain access to the reports via a Freedom of Information Act request 
to the DOJ and the SEC, and then in subsequent litigation before the district 
court and D.C. Circuit.109 The SEC joined AIG in contesting the reporter’s 
request for information, with the SEC explaining that if confidentiality was not 
maintained it would have difficulty entering into “similar agreements in the 
future.”110 Thus, it went out of its way to ensure that the monitor’s report 
remained secret.111 
In 2015, an issue was raised before a district court in United States v. HSBC 
Bank USA,112 regarding whether a monitor’s interim report should be kept under 
confidential seal or made publicly available.113 In this case the DOJ argued in 
favor of keeping the report confidential. In support of the argument, the DOJ 
quoted the following rationale: 
 
 107.  SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2013). 
 108.  Id. at 78. 
 109.  SEC v. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 110.  Am. Int’l Grp., 854 F. Supp. 2d at 82. 
 111.  I have previously argued that cases of this nature should be entitled to a monitor-privilege. I am 
not meaning to be critical of the government’s position in the case, but I am suggesting that the case 
exemplifies how much the government values cooperation and the lengths it will go to protect the 
incentives for firms to cooperate. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-”Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 
523 (2014) (arguing in favor of a privilege protecting communications amongst a corporate compliance 
monitor, corporation, and the government). 
 112.  United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-cr-00763, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59231, 
(E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2016). 
 113.  Id. at *3. 
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Officials with law enforcement responsibilities may be heavily reliant upon the 
voluntary cooperation of persons who may want or need confidentiality. If that 
confidentiality cannot be assured, cooperation will not be forthcoming. . . . If release is 
likely to cause persons in the particular or future cases to resist involvement where 
cooperation is desirable, that effect should be weighed against the presumption of 
access.114 
As evidenced by these cases, and others, the government has indicated both 
an ability and willingness to expend time and money to ensure its assurances of 
secrecy are not upended because, in part, it might impact its ability to ensure 
future disclosure of information from corporate offenders. 
* * * * 
The prioritization of information gathering by federal enforcers may seem 
unremarkable,115 but it is quite significant. For over twenty years, federal 
prosecutors and regulators—through the formal pressure of policy, oversight 
measures of remediation efforts, and alliances with corporations it is in the midst 
of investigating, overseeing, and sanctioning—have prioritized their ability to 
obtain information from corporate offenders.116 These prosecutors and regulators 
have done so even while facing criticism for being too lenient when levying 
sanctions against these same offenders. The federal government is not acting as 
if its primary task is to enforce the law. The federal government is, instead, acting 
as if its primary task is to gather information from corporations as part of its effort 
to ensure that that legal and regulatory requirements are adhered to by the 
corporations’ agents and members. 
 
 114.  Mot. to File Monitor’s Rep. Under Seal at 8, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-
763-JG (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2015), ECF No. 35, 2015 WL 11652652 (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995)). The District Court Judge ordered the public 
disclosure of the report with redactions. The Second Circuit overruled. United States v. HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 115.  See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 643, 648 (2002) (explaining that corporations have “traded” cooperation with an 
investigation for “government-granted favors,” like leniency). 
 116.  There might, however, be other theories for explaining the government’s seeming reluctance to 
utilize the full set of sanctions at their disposable besides unwillingness or an emphasis on information 
disclosure. For example, in 2016, Professor Jennifer Arlen argued that the increased use of deferred- and 
non-prosecution agreements is inconsistent with the rule of law, and she noted that the rise of these 
vehicles for sanctioning corporate offenders has imbued prosecutors with an enormous amount of power. 
Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 226 (2016). Assuming prosecutors are being 
influenced by a desire to preserve their own power, they could also still be motivated by a desire to 
receive full and complete cooperation from organizations under investigation for misconduct within their 
ranks. Indeed, one reason prosecutor’s might want to preserve their own power is to ensure that they can 
pursue cooperative ends when crafting a set of sanctions to enter into with a corporate offender. 
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White 
Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 174–75 (2004) (noting that while 
criminal indictments “are not routine, the power to indict, combined with collateral consequences and 
market forces, enhances the power of prosecutors to investigate corporate crime. . . . [This] motivates 
firms to conduct in-house investigations, cooperate fully with prosecutors, distance themselves from the 
conduct of their agent, and jettison employees involved in the transaction.”). 
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IV 
IMPLICATIONS 
As argued in Part III, federal enforcers have, whether purposefully or by 
happenstance, adopted a model of enforcement that prioritizes gathering 
information from firms over levying significant sanctions against them. This 
insight raises a whole host of questions for diverse areas of scholarly concern, 
including criminal law, administrative law, corporate law and others, and there 
could be both benefits and costs to the government’s quest to gather information 
that may change depending upon what lens one uses to frame the relevant issues.  
This Part considers three sets of implications of this model, focusing on those 
related to federal enforcers’ focus on obtaining information from corporate 
offenders regarding firms’ efforts to create, implement, and adhere to effective 
ethics and compliance programs. It contends that the government’s prioritization 
of information without a meaningful commitment to maximize the use of that 
information for the public’s benefit is undermining compliance efforts. 
Specifically, the government is not utilizing the information it gathers to (i) 
maximize federal enforcers’ understanding and evaluation of compliance best 
practices or (ii) empower the types of public and private partnerships known to 
create lasting change within organizations. As such, enforcers should determine 
how they might better utilize the information they are gathering so that the public 
benefits from the government’s considerable and sustained efforts over the past 
two decades 
A. Federal Enforcers’ Evaluations of Compliance Programs 
The government has long recognized the importance of incentivizing firms to 
engage in effective ethics and compliance programs. As noted above, this is, at 
least in part, because employees and agents of the corporation are going to have 
the best information about the inner workings of the organization, which is 
necessary information for creating or modifying an effective compliance 
program. And yet, the government must make a determination regarding the 
effectiveness of a firm’s ethics and compliance program when deciding an 
appropriate resolution to the firm’s misconduct. 
During the Obama Administration, the DOJ created a new position for an 
internal, full-time compliance expert, whose job was to assist and advise 
prosecutors when they needed to assess whether a firm did or did not have an 
effective ethics and compliance program.117 Importantly, having a dedicated 
individual in this role served to prompt line prosecutors to prioritize the 
compliance efforts at the firm when determining the appropriate resolution of a 
case against a corporate offender. Additionally, the compliance expert trained 
prosecutors on what they should look for in a compliance program and developed 
 
 117.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud 
Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download [https://perma. 
cc/7YDU-MLUB]. 
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the DOJ’s first Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs.118 In short, the 
DOJ recognized the need not only for expertise in the area, but also for 
coordination within the DOJ that would allow it to better filter the information 
it gathered about the state of firms’ compliance efforts. 
The Trump Administration, however, has taken a different route. In October 
2018, then-Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski announced 
changes to the DOJ’s approach to evaluating compliance.119 Instead of utilizing a 
centralized structure for evaluating compliance, he decentralized the process, so 
that individual prosecutors would be responsible for assessing the compliance 
activities of firms on their own.120 In doing so, he was careful to explain that 
prosecutors would receive training relevant to compliance efforts in their subject 
matter areas.121 Additionally, the DOJ recently updated the Evaluation of 
Corporate Compliance Programs in an effort to “assist prosecutors in making 
informed decisions as to whether, and to what extent, the corporation’s 
compliance program was effective at the time of the offense, and is effective at 
the time of a charging decision or resolution.”122 
These efforts on the part of the DOJ do not appear to be performative. The 
DOJ took a great deal of time and effort to create, develop, and cement the 
government’s commitment to ensuring firms prioritize the creation and 
implementation of effective ethics and compliance programs. Yet, the current 
policy positions undertaken by the DOJ are squandering opportunity after 
opportunity for the DOJ as an institution to deepen its knowledge and expertise 
regarding what does and does not work within the compliance space. 
When the DOJ had a point person in charge of evaluating compliance, it 
allowed information regarding compliance activities across a whole host of firms 
to trickle up to that point person who could aggregate that information, make 
comparisons about what was occurring, and extrapolate from all of that 
information what sorts of activities might become industry best practices. And, 
importantly, those best practices could then become incorporated into the DOJ’s 
resolutions with firms. But today, that information flows into particular line 
prosecutors and enforcement actors, without any formalized dissemination 
 
 118.  Department of Justice Fraud Section Provides Guidance on Evaluating Corporate Compliance 
Programs, JONES DAY (Feb. 2017), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/02/department-of-
justice-fraud-section-provides-guidance-on-evaluating-corporate-compliance-programs [https://perma. 
cc/66RM-JJBX. 
 119.  Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at NYU School of 
Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective 
Compliance (Oct. 12, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-nyu-school-law-program [https://perma.cc/PQ2F-
B4W7]). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIM. DIV., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
(June 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/E4PK-
KA57]. 
04 - MARTINEZ - INFORMATION OVER SANCTION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2021 12:36 PM 
108 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:85 
process across the DOJ itself or across other enforcement agencies that have 
information about firms’ compliance activities. 
Why might this be problematic or concerning? In previous work, I have 
determined that there are significant inter- and intra-agency coordination 
challenges associated with the government’s ability to recognize and 
appropriately sanction corporate repeat offenders.123 Indeed, corporate repeat 
offenders were not treated as recidivists and subject to a heightened sanction 
unless they were previously before the exact same enforcement agent or division 
(that is, DOJ Fraud or DOJ Antitrust), but not if they were previously before 
different divisions within the DOJ itself (that is, DOJ Fraud then DOJ Antitrust). 
If the DOJ is unable to incentivize intra-agency coordination when formal 
resolutions are occurring, why would one expect the DOJ to be engaged in robust 
coordination of disseminating information regarding compliance practices if no 
one at DOJ is actually in charge of doing so? 
It is worth noting that this decentralized approach benefits the individual 
federal enforcers, in that they develop an expertise that is helpful to them going 
forward. As long as that individual enforcer remains with the government, their 
expertise also benefits the government. Benczkowski’s own statement alludes124 
to the reality that many of the individuals who work in these positions will have 
“revolving door” careers, where they spend some time in government service, go 
back to private practice, and so on. As such, the benefits of the increased 
knowledge of the individual enforcer to the DOJ and other governmental 
agencies is limited to the time that individual remains with the government. For 
federal enforcers to truly harness the power of the information being gathered, 
they must find some way to transfer the knowledge and insights to the larger 
institution in a systematic and deliberate fashion. 
B. Failure to Effectively Leverage Public-Private Compliance Partnerships 
While a great deal of information flows into the government regarding 
various firms’ compliance practices, not nearly as much flows back out into 
industry. When federal regulators and prosecutors demand information from 
corporations but fail to reciprocate by collaborating with industry members in 
creating and developing best practices for achieving effective compliance 
programs, the government wastes a valuable opportunity to curb corporate 
misconduct more generally. To be fair, there are some federal regulators that 
actively share information with regulated entities, but many do not.125 When the 
government’s information regarding best compliance practices remains hidden, 
it constrains effective compliance. 
 
 123.  Root, supra note 42. 
 124.  Benczkowski, supra note 119. 
 125.  The Department of Education, for example, uses a variety of resources like “Dear Colleague 
Letters” to provide information to the entities it regulates and oversees. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OSEP 
POLICY DOCUMENTS, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/index.html#pl 
[https://perma.cc/CQ4Z-D3A7]. 
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As explained by Professor Miriam Baer, applying a new governance 
framework of public and private partnerships has been perceived as challenging 
within the corporate enforcement context, specifically for criminal prosecutors, 
because of the inherently adversarial posture of the initial interactions.126 Yet, the 
changes in corporate enforcement activities, particularly the DOJ’s more recent 
steps taken toward providing additional compliance guidance to firms,127 suggests 
that even within the adversarial system, there may be more federal enforcers can 
do to ensure that the information they gather is better and more fully utilized to 
benefit the public via the dissemination of best practices observed by federal 
enforcers to regulated firms. 
The government could harness the information it is receiving to create and 
publish best practices for achieving effective compliance within firms. This sort 
of information might seem odd to flow from federal prosecutors, but for federal 
regulators it should, in theory, be par for the course. A regulator is particularly 
connected with members of the regulated industry and should be comfortable 
providing guidance to firms it oversees.128 Federal prosecutors are not thought to 
have the same sort of expertise regarding prosecuted firms. However, as noted 
by Benczkowski, the process preceding the resolution of alleged misconduct via 
a negotiated settlement agreement provides prosecutors the opportunity to 
obtain information about a firm and its compliance efforts.129 Indeed, part of the 
role of external counsel representing a firm negotiating a settlement with DOJ is 
to convey the context surrounding the misconduct and any potential strengths 
and weaknesses of the firm’s compliance program.130 And while some negotiated 
settlement agreements do not require more detailed, formal disclosures than 
those already required under existing regulations and statutes, (i) we do not know 
what is communicated during the negotiation process and (ii) there are instances 
where a firm is required to do “more” under a settlement131 or a compliance 
 
 126.  Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 954 (2009) 
(explaining that new governance is “often described as a theory of regulation characterized by a 
collaborative tone between regulator and regulated entity, a problem-solving orientation, continuous 
assessment and revision of both expected outcomes and implementation processes, pooling of 
information by and among regulated entities and regulators, and interagency cooperation”). 
 127.  Supra Part III.A. 
 128.  For example, the FTC provides guidance easily available on its website “to help businesses 
understand their responsibilities and comply with the law.” Federal Trade Comm’n, Guidance, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance [https://perma.cc/GBB5-
AED4]. See also Van Loo, supra note 16, at 397 (explaining the collaborative approach to solving 
regulatory problems which emphasizes partnership between regulators and firms). 
 129.  Benczkowski, supra note 119. 
 130.  See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate 
Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 529 (2004) (“Easier access to information makes 
untangling its complexity easier, but only a little; investigators still need expertise. Voluntary cooperation 
can provide that expertise as well as information access.”). 
 131.  See, e.g., Post, Veronica Root Martinez, More Meaningful Ethics, UNIV. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 
(Jan. 7, 2020) (explaining that a settlement between Facebook and the FTC required Facebook to engage 
in activity that surpassed “current US law”), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/01/07/more-
meaningful-ethics-by-veronica-root-martinez/ [https://perma.cc/L6A2-BFT2]. 
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agreement than is required by law.132 Finally, negotiated settlement agreements 
often mandate a variety of corporate governance reforms beyond just changes to 
the compliance program.133 
Federal enforcers are taking in a great deal of information. If they could 
gather, aggregate, and analyze that information as is suggested in Part III.A., they 
could then facilitate the dissemination of information to companies regarding 
best practices for firms’ compliance efforts. In doing so, federal enforcers could 
provide additional public benefits that would help to justify their prioritization of 
information over significant sanction. 
C. The Upshot 
The government’s key incentive to ensure that firms invest in effective ethics 
and compliance programs is the big stick threat of a significant sanction if the 
corporation fails to do so. The law and economics models that urge the 
government to provide mitigation credit to incentivize self-policing also note the 
need for the possibility of a significant sanction if firms fail to engage in that 
effort.134 When the government prioritizes the receipt of information over 
obtaining sanctions, it is quite literally tying the hands working so hard to provide 
guidance on compliance programs behind its back. 
If the government wants to prioritize information over sanctions, it should do 
so in a manner that does not diminish its efforts to incentivize the compliance 
project. And it can. As demonstrated in Part II.A., the DOJ and other federal 
regulators are generally free to adjust their policy preferences.135 This means 
federal enforcers could choose to act in a manner that encourages, instead of 
undermines, collaborations both between the federal government and firms, and 
between firms themselves in an effort to improve compliance across entire 
industries. But taking the status quo as true, the government’s current positions 
appear to be undermining compliance efforts and need to shift. 
The upshot is that if the government wants to prioritize information over 
sanction, it should do so in a way that enables federal enforcers to utilize that 
information in a purposeful, cooperative manner that provides direct benefits to 
firms and, thereby, the public. This could be done in a variety of ways, but at least 
one of the government’s goals should be to ensure better compliance with legal 
and regulatory requirements by corporations. Federal enforcers can actively 
 
 132.  See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 6, United States v. Princess Cruise 
Lines, Ltd., No. 16-20897 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that the fine was the “largest-ever” for 
intentional vessel pollution and that the ECP is the “most comprehensive” to ever have been imposed 
on a cruise line). 
 133.  Arlen, supra note 116. 
 134.  Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 691–94. 
 135.  See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 133–
34 (2020) (“DOJ policies are merely guidelines. They are not binding on prosecutors and seek only to 
inform decision-making. The experience with the Yates Memo suggests that such guidance and policies 
may not be fully implemented if there are practical and resource-based obstacles to doing so.”). 
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bolster the compliance project by purposefully using the information they are 
gathering to assist in this effort. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The actions of federal prosecutors and regulators over the past twenty years 
suggest that federal enforcers have, whether purposefully or not, adopted a 
model of enforcement that prioritizes gathering information from firms over 
levying significant sanctions against them. There is nothing inherently 
problematic about gathering information. 
And yet, when the federal enforcers fail to harness and share the insights they 
gather from firms, it wastes a unique opportunity to curb corporate misconduct 
in a broad-based manner by strengthening the very compliance programs they 
purport to incent. Government prosecutors and regulators should consider how 
they might utilize information garnered as a result of firms’ cooperation in a 
manner that might improve the effectiveness of firms’ compliance efforts on a 
widespread basis. 
 
